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Abstract.  This article examines the nature of interregional competition and 
complementarity in Greece. The methodological framework deviates from the 
Dendrinos-Sonis model as applied in previous studies with the same scope. In fact we 
show that for different choices of the numeraire region one may get different 
outcomes for the interregional dynamics. Our methodology is close to the one adopted 
in Marquez and Hewings (2003) and Marquez et al. (2005) that is closely connected 
to the recently developed econometric methods for testing Granger-causality in 
cointegrated systems. We apply it to NUTS I and NUTS II level regions.  
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The goal of this study is to determine the types and the degree of spatial economic 
relationships among the Greek regions. We analyze competition-complementarity 
relationships for NUTS-I and NUTS-II level regions trying to answer via statistical 
modeling the following questions: Do Greek regions play against each other in 
attracting economic opportunities, and if so, should they? Do they compete for 
economic development, or do some pairs of them complement each other in terms of 
development? Is development in one region adversely affecting economic growth in a 
neighboring region? Might tax money used to promote growth in one area also spur 
growth in another place? 
  There has been a series of recent articles that aim to uncover regional 
competition-complementarity dynamics the vast majority of which are based in the 
theoretical framework proposed by Dendrinos and Sonis (1988, 1990). Hewings et al. 
(1996) investigated regional dynamics for an aggregate set of U.S. regions and 
produced forecasts for the progress of regional convergence into the next decades. 
Magalhaes et al. (1999) compared regional linkages for a set of Northeastern 
Brazilian states as derived from the Dendrinos-Sonis (D-S) model, to the ones 
observed for the states of Midwest in U.S.  Nazara et al. (2001) provides a very nice 
exposition of the method and applies it to six major Indonesian regions. Dall’erba and 
Percoco (2003) applied the same method to a set of Italian regions, Dall’erba (2004) 
examined relationships between Spanish and Portuguese regions and Bonet (2003) 
worked similarly for a set of Colombian regions.  
  The methodology in this article deviates from the aforementioned ones in 
issues related to the D-S model and its application; our point of view is closer to the 
one presented in Marquez and Hewings (2003) and Marquez et al. (2005). A 
drawback of the D-S model is that it cannot be applied directly to a large number of 
regions due to the almost sure presence of multicollinearity that is expected to distort 
estimations. The major disadvantage though, is that as applied till now it may lead to 
results that contradict, depending on the choice of the numeraire region. Indeed, 
Nazara et al. (2001) point out in a footnote the possible inconsistency of the model 
which we demonstrate at the fourth section of our article. Different choices for the 
numeraire may lead to different outcomes for the regional competition-
complementarity scheme. Our point of view is that there should not be any numeraire 
in the model; then the examination of regional competition-complementarity 
dynamics falls in the class of econometric problems related to Granger causality for 
cointegrated variables.  
  The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes very briefly 
regional economic conditions on Greece and the dataset of the study. Next we discuss 
the D-S model and in the fourth section we apply it for different choices of the 
numeraire region where we observe different results depending on the choice. The 
fifth and sixth sections examine the national effect on regional dynamics and 
interregional competition complementarity along the lines of Marquez and Hewings 
(2003) and Marquez et al. (2005). We end the article with some concluding remarks.  
 
2 Greek Regional Economic Conditions: A Brief Exposition  
 
Our analysis focuses on Greece during the period 1979-1999 using data from 
EUROSTAT’s REGIO database. Greece covers an area of 132,000 km
2, has a 
population of 11,000,000 and is divided into 51 prefectures (NUTS III regions). The 
geographical units of our analysis are initially the 4 NUTS I regions and in the sequel 
the 13 NUTS II regions. Figure 1 depicts the 13 NUTS II level regions; East 
Makedonia-Thraki (GR11), Central Makedonia (GR12), West Makedonia (GR13) and 
Thessalia (GR14) form the NUTS I region Northern Greece (GR1), Ipeiros (GR21), 
Ionia Islands (GR22), West Greece (GR23) and Central Greece (GR24) form the 
NUTS I region Central Greece (GR2), Attiki (GR3) is both a NUTS I and NUTS II 
region and North Aegean (GR41), South Aegean (GR42) and Crete (GR43) form the 
NUTS I region Southern Greece and the islands (GR4). The main characteristic of the 
regional pattern in Greece is the existence of a great concentration of population, 
economic activities and infrastructure in the Greater Athens area and in the main 
urban center of Northern Greece, Thesaloniki. Thus, economic and urban activity is 
largely developed along this axis. This model of development changed during the 
1980s as a result of the emergence of new sectors of specialization that favored 
regions of Northern Greece and to a lesser extent, the islands and some peripheral 
regions. The IMP and CSF programs during the 1980s and 1990s improved this 
situation further.      
Studies of regional convergence in Greece have been conducted by 
Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998) and Petrakos and Saratsis (2000). Both studies ran β-
convergence regressions over the periods 1971-1996 and 1981-1991 respectively, 
basing their analysis on per capita output. While Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998) 
concluded that there had been no tendency for regional income differences to 
disappear, Petrakos and Saratsis (2000) argued for a decrease in Greek regional 
inequalities (i.e. convergence) in the 1980s. This disparity might be attributed to the 
data employed and to the different level of spatial disaggregation, NUTS II and NUTS 
III respectively. Recently, Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) studied the effect of 
technological gaps and capital deepening on the productivity growth of Greek 
prefectures over the period 1971-1995. Their results indicate that Greek prefectures 
tended to converge over time, contrary to conventional wisdom.   
  
Figure 1. Greek regions 
 
 
  Figure 2. Per Capita GDP in Euros. GR: Greece, GR1-4: NUTS I level 
regions.   
3 The Dendrinos-Sonis model 
 
In the DS model the relative regional shares of the socioeconomic stock under study 
at a given time period are expressed as a function of the relative shares of all the 
regions during the previous time period. With respect to a particular stock, then, the 
competitive position of a region this year is a result of the competitor regions’ 
competitive positions in the previous year.   
Let  ST Γ  be an economy defined over space and time, S be a finite number of 
regions in the economy and T be the time horizon. Further, let  () ST t t st Y Y Y Y ,..., , 2 1 = , 
where  () 1 0 ≤ ≤ st Y  represent a spatio-temporal distribution of regional economic 
activity and () T t S s ,..., 1 ; ,..., 1 = = . Following Dendrinos and Sonis (1990), we 
consider a set of arbitrary positive real-valued functions,  ( ) St t t jt F F F F ,..., , 2 1 =  such 
that each  jt F  is defined at each time period t by a subset of  st Y . The general discrete 
nonlinear process can then be defined as  
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If we let region 1 be the numeraire region, we can define 
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The process defined in (1) can be restated using  ojt F  explicitly to represent the 
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A log linear specification of the function  ojt F  suggested by Dendrinos and Sonis 
(1988) is adopted in all DS-model applications encountered in the literature so far. It 
is given by  
    ∏ =
k
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are the regional growth elasticities, with  . ∞ < < ∞ − sk a  Using the log-linear form we 
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Regional interaction at this level is assumed to involve a competition whereby each 
region attempts to increase its share of socio-economic stock, which is attained by 
improving its comparative advantages. However this behavior will depend on the rest 
of the states’ behavior that is reflected in the sign and magnitude of the elasticities 
() sk a . A negative sign for  sk a  indicates the existence of a competitive relation 
between regions s and k, i.e., if the socio-economic stock share of region s increases, 
the share of region k will decrease and vice-versa. A positive coefficient indicates a 
complementarity relationship between s and k. To our knowledge, in all applications 
encountered in the literature so far, the elasticities are estimated via the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions estimator.  
 
 
4 Sensitivity Analysis for the Numeraire Region 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of the NUTS I-region D-S model for 
GDP per capita. The table contains estimations for five seemingly unrelated 
regressions systems: the first four correspond to all possible choices for the numeraire 
region whereas in the last system there is no numeraire. The no-numeraire system 
could be equivalently written as a Vector Autoregressive model of order one 
(VAR(1)). The last observation bridges the gap between previous D-S model 
applications as reported in the introduction and the error correction modeling (ECM) 
approach presented in Marquez and Hewings (2003) and Marquez et al. (2005) and 
brings the methodological framework close to Granger-causality tests for cointegrated 
systems; see Toda and Phillips (1993), Bruneau and Jondeau (1999), Yamamoto and 
Kurozumi (2003), Chigira and Yamamoto (2003), Dufour et al. (2003).   
  Reading down the columns of table 1 indicates that for Attiki as numeraire, a 
positive shock to Attiki would cause a decrease in the relative GDP of all other 
regions whereas for Southern Greece as numeraire a positive shock to the GDP of 
Attiki would cause an increase in the relative GDP of all other regions. The 
inconsistency of the D-S model as it was applied till now is more clearly 









Table 1. Application of the D-S model to NUTS I regions for all possible numeraires. 
Left part: SUR coefficients. Right part: Symbolic representation of interregional 
dynamics (++Complementarity significant at the 0.05 level, +Complementarity 
significant at the 0.1 level, -Competition significant at the 0.1 level, --Competition 
significant at the 0.05 level,) 
 
D-S 4-REGION MODEL: NORTHERN GREECE NUMERAIRE 
GDP  per  capita             
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
Central -0.46 0.624  0.086 -0.252  Central   ++    - 
Attiki -.777  0.015 0.542  0.227 Attica -    ++   
South-
Islands 
0.204 -0.429  -.303  0.534  South-
Islands 
 -- --  ++ 
D-S 4-REGION MODEL: CENTRAL GREECE NUMERAIRE 
GDP  per  capita             
 North  Central  Attica  South-
Islands 
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
North 0.46 -0.624  -0.08  0.252 North   --    + 
Attiki -.316  -0.609  0.455  0.479 Attica   --  ++  ++ 
South-
Islands 
0.665 -1.05  -.389  0.785  South-
Islands 
+ --  -- ++ 
D-S 4-REGION MODEL: ATTIKI NUMERAIRE 
GDP  per  capita             
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
North 0.777  -.015  -.542  -.227 North +    --   
Central 0.317 0.609  -.455  -.479  Central   ++  --  -- 
South-
Islands 
0.981 -.444  -.845  0.307  South-
Islands 
++ --  --  + 
D-S 4-REGION MODEL: SOUTHERN GREECE NUMERAIRE 
GDP  per  capita             
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
North -.204  0.429 0.303  -0.533  North   ++  ++  -- 
Central -.665 1.053  0.389 -.785  Central -  ++  ++  -- 
Attiki -.981  0.444 0.845  -0.306  Attica --  ++  ++  - 
D-S 4-REGION MODEL: NO NUMERAIRE 
GDP  per  capita             
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
 North  Central  Attiki  South-
Islands 
North -.565  0.663 0.458  0.446 North        
Central -1.03 1.286  0.544 0.194  Central   ++  +   
Attiki -1.34  0.677 0.999  0.673 Attica   +  ++  ++ 
South-
Islands 
-.361 0.234  0.155 0.979  South-
Islands 




 5 The National Effect  
 
To estimate the influence of the national aggregate (economy-wide effect) over each 
of the four NUTS I regions, we use a specification similar to the one referred to as 
regional curve by Marquez et al. (2005). More precisely the formulation is  
 
it nt i i it y y ε β β + + = 1 0 ,      i=1,…,4    (or 1,…,13)    t=1979,…,1999.            (3)  
 
where yit denotes the gdp for region i and time period  t, ynt the national gdp at time t, 
β0i is the share of gdp growth unexplained by the evolution of the national level for 
region  i, whereas β1i  indicates whether the corresponding regional observation 
increases or diminishes when the national gdp increases. From (3) one has to estimate 
a system of seemingly unrelated regressions. The corresponding estimations from our 
dataset, presented at tables 2 and 3, indicate positive relations with the national per 
capita gdp per for all NUTS I and NUTS II regions. The reader should notice that 
intercepts and slopes corresponding to Attiki (GR3) are very close to zero and very 
close to one respectively, indicating an almost perfect correlation.  
 
 
Table 2. SUR Coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for relation (3) 
corresponding to the NUTS I regions. 




















Table 3. SUR Coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for relation (3) 
corresponding to the NUTS II regions.   

























































6 Regional patterns of competition and complementarity: Error Correction  
   Modeling 
 
The fifth SUR system estimated in the fourth section is equivalent to a VAR(1) 
model. One should expect economic variables considered in studies of the kind we 
deal with to be integrated, and for systems of such variables some cointegrating 
relationships to hold. That is exactly the methodological framework Marquez and 
Hewings (2003) and Marquez et al. (2005) propose for the examination of 
competition and complementarity dynamics.   As the functional structure of the equations making up the empirical dynamic 
model is based on the cointegration approach an ECM model is formulated to 
examine whether there is a short-run adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. 
Specifically, ‘standard’ equations are proposed in the form of ECM, in which a long-
term equilibrium relationship is set up between the explanatory and the endogenous 
variables, at the same time as allowing the existence of short-term deviations with 
respect to this equilibrium through the inclusion of dynamic terms. The general 
ECM(1) model structure is given by the expression: 
 
  t t t t y y y ε + Φ∆ + Π = ∆ − − 1 1           ( 4 )  
 
where  ∆ represents the first difference operator, yt denotes the vector containing 
regional gdp observations at time t,  Π and Φ are rectangular matrices containing 
unknown coefficients and εt is the innovations vector for which we assume the usual 
properties.  Thus, the first difference of the log of region’s i gdp at time t (or short-
term deviations from the equilibrium) is explained by the first difference of the lagged 
values of the dependent variable, by the first difference of the variables that 
cointegrate with yit and by an error correction term. 
  Next, we display the ECM modeling results as obtained for the NUTS I level 
regional system. Per capita gdp observations are clearly nonstationary as observed by 
figure 2; the appropriate Dickey-Fuller tests (not shown) indicate the presence of a 
unit root for all the (four) variables under study. We proceed via applying Johansen’s 
cointegration trace test, to detect the presence and the number of cointegrating (long -
run) relationships. Table 4 indicates that there are 3 equilibrium relationships for the 4 
regions of our study; table 5 contains the estimated cointegrating relationships, 
standardized with respect to GR1 and table 6 depicts the estimated short-term 
equations.  
 
Table 4. Johansen’s cointegration rank test for the 4 NUTS regions. 
H0:Rank=r H1:Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace  Critical  Value 
0 0 0.8696  84.1  39.71 
1 1 0.6903  43.36  24.08 
2 2 0.55  19.92  12.21 
3 3 0.1789  3.94  4.14 
  
 
Table 5. Results of the estimation of the cointegrating relationships 
 
t t t t y y y y 3 2 2 1 539 . 0 0316 . 0 43 . 0 + + =  
t t t t y y y y 3 2 2 1 216 . 0 0565 . 0 21 . 0 + + =  
t t t t y y y y 3 2 2 1 56 . 39 523 . 0 40 + + − =  
 
 
 Table 6. Results of the ECM estimation.  
 
1 4
) 315 . 0 (
1 3
) 256 . 0 (
1 2
) 257 . 0 (
1 1
) 71 . 0 (
1 429 . 0 459 . 0 62 . 0 5 . 1 − − − − + + + − = ∆ t t t t t y y y y y  
1 4
) 311 . 0 (
1 3
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1 2
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1 1
) 71 . 0 (
2 256 . 0 539 . 0 466 . 0 26 . 1 − − − − + + + − = ∆ t t t t t y y y y y  
1 4
) 263 . 0 (
1 3
) 215 . 0 (
1 2
) 216 . 0 (
1 1
) 598 . 0 (
3 7 . 0 0025 . 0 756 . 0 446 . 1 − − − − + − + − = ∆ t t t t t y y y y y  
1 4
) 364 . 0 (
1 3
) 296 . 0 (
1 2
) 298 . 0 (
1 1
) 826 . 0 (
4 004 . 0 153 . 0 304 . 0 45 . 0 − − − − + + + − = ∆ t t t t t y y y y y  
 
 
6 Concluding Remarks  
 
The paper draws on some diverse issues related to the topic of regional competition to 
provide the motivation for the application of a new approach. The contribution is in 
the field of dynamic regional competition where there have been a few studies to 
explore the nature of the relationships between adjacent regions over time. The results 
offer a potentially interesting implication for the design of spatially targeted 
strategies. In a subsequent  version of the article we plan: 
- To explore sectoral effects in the interregional dynamics that may be masked by 
the current setting. 
- To link the ECM setting with the recent advances in Granger causality tests for 
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